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COMMENTARY

Law and Union Power:
Thoughts on the United States and Canada
JAMES B. ATLESON*

T

he decline in the strength and vigor of American labor unions
has led to a valuable outpouring of scholarly writing analyzing
the causes and offering possible cures. Many have stressed changes
in the national and international economy as well as other economic
or social causes, but the primary focus of this essay is on the
explanations which attribute much of labor's decline to the
inadequacies of public law.
Although legal rules certainly affect union strength and vitality, formal law is also a reflection of societal pressures and imbalances of power. Legal rules can increase union strength, but supportive legal change is unlikely to occur in the absence of union
power, at least the power to disrupt. If labor is perceived to be weak,
there is less need to interpret labor statutes broadly to either lessen
the incidence of strikes or to institutionalize labor conflict.
Most analyses, however, view law as a critical source of union
strength rather than a reflection of social and economic power. Thus,
a number of writers have stressed Canada's more supportive labor
legislation, relying upon existing structures and rules, as an explanation for its stronger labor movement. The argument made is that
Canadian unions are stronger because Canadian labor legislation is
more congenial to union organization and bargaining than that of
the United States. The interest in Canada's labor policies has grown
as union density rates between the two countries seem to grow more
disparate. Today, approximately 35% of Canada's non-agricultural
workforce is unionized compared to 17% or less in the United
States.' Charts 1 and 2 show the relative situation.
* Professor of Law, State University of New York School of Law. An earlier version
of this paper was presented to the Canadian-American Legal Studies Program at SUNY
Law School in Spring, 1990, and the 1991 Law and Society Meeting in Amsterdam. The
author wishes to thank Judy Fudge of Osgoode Hall Law School, James Pope of RutgersNewark Law School, and Cynthia Eslund of Texas Law School for their comments.
1. BUREAU OF LABOUR INFOPMATION, DIRECTORY OF LABOUR ORGANIzATIONs IN

CANADA at xii (1989); Gary Chaison & Joseph Rose, New Directionsand Divergent Paths:
The North American Labor Movements in Troubled Times, LAB. L.J. 591 (1990)
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CHART 12
UNION DENSITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, 1935-1980
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UNION MEMBERSHIP BASED ON CPS SURVEYS 1977-1991
Number

Year

Number
Eligible
(in 000's)

Organized
(in 000's)

Percentage
Organized

Number
Covered
(in 000's)

Percentage
Covered

1977
1980
1983
1984

81,334
87,480
88,290
92,194

19,335
20,095
17,717
17,340

23.80%
23.00
20.10
18.80

21,535
22,493
20,532
19,932

26.50%
25.7
23.3
21.6

[hereinafter Chaison & Rose, New Directions].
2. Chart 1 is reproduced from Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1888 (1983)
[hereinafter Weiler, Promises]. Chart 2's sources can be found in the following: 1980 and
1983-84 data from U.S. Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics) 1985 (p. 208);
1977 data from U.S. Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statitsics) 1979; and 1985-92
data from U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings.
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Year

Number
Eligible
(in 000's)

Number
Organized
(in 000's)

Percentage
Organized

Number
Covered
(in 000's)

Percentage
Covered

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

94,500
96,903
99,303
101,407
103,480
103,905
102,786

17,000
16,900
17,600
16,960
16,704
16,704
16,568

18.00
17.50
17.00
16.80
16.40
16.10
16.10

19,400
19,300
19,050
19,240
19,198
19,058
18,734

20.5
19.9
19.2
19.0
18.6
18.3
18.2

Chart 1 reveals that organizational levels in Canada and the
United States, that is, union membership as a percentage of the
workforce, were approximately equal between 1955 and 1965, but

U.S. membership as a percentage of the non-agricultural workforce
began a steady decline in 1955, until it experienced a precipitous fall
in the 1980s.3 It is during this period that the absolute number of
U.S. workers in unions fell for the first time since 1950. Katherine
Stone notes that a 25 percent loss was suffered by unions in the

1980s despite the fact that there had been a 15 percent gain in the
1970s.1 Moreover, the 1980s decline is most pronounced in the private sector where membership declined from 16.8 percent of the
non-agricultural work force to 12.4 percent. The long term decline
cannot be explained simply by the Reagan-Bush years, the PATCO
debacle, a hostile Supreme Court and NLRB or the specific problems
3. See Weiler, Promises, supra note 2. See also Christopher Huxley et al., Is
Canada's Experience 'Especially Instructive?", in UNIONS IN TRANSITION: ENTERING THE
SECOND CENTURY 113 (Seymore Martin Lipset ed., 1986) [hereinafter Huxley]; MICHAEL
GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 94-112, 221 (1987).

There was a marked decrease in union election activity in the 1980s. A 1985 report
of the AFL-CIO's Committee on the Evolution of Work suggested a variety of techniques
to reverse the downward trend in the number of representation elections and the growth
of membership via elections. The federation created the Organizing Institute in 1989 to
assist unions in coordinating organizing drives and in recruiting and training organizers.
The number of representation elections continued to decline, however, and evidence suggests that organizing is of secondary importance to servicing current members. Paul
Jarky et al., Embracing the Committee on the Evolution of Work Report: What Have
Unions Done, in 44 INDUS. REL. RES. ASS'N PROC. 500, 506-07 (1992).
4. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of IndustrialPluralism: The Tension Between IndividualEmployment Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 579 (1992).
After 14 years of decline, the number of union members rose during 1993 according
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The modest growth of 200,000 or 1.3% from the 1992
level was primarily due to public sector increases. Indeed, because of declines in public
sector unionism, the portion of all employees in unions remained at 15.8%. 145 [1 News &
Background Information] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 207 (Feb. 21, 1994).
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labor encountered the last 12 years, although these specific events
do seem related to labor's precipitous decline in the 1980s. [See
Chart 2]
A very useful chart of Canadian and American levels since 1945
has been composed by Brian Langille of the University of Toronto
Law School.5 Chart 3 reveals that American unions reached their
highest levels of organization in the early 1950s and then began
their decline, while Canadian unions either held steady or increased
organizational levels. The significantly higher Canadian density
rate reflects a high level of organization in the public sector. Indeed,
the three largest
unions in Canada represent federal and provincial
6
employees.
CHART 37
UNION MEMBERSHIP IN CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES 1945-1990
Total Membership (000)
Year

Canada

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961

711

832
912
978
1,006
1,029
1,146
1,220
1,268
1,268
1,352
1,386
1,454
1,459
1,459
1,447

As a % of Non-Agricultural
Workers
Canada

12,254
12,936
14,067
14,272
13,936
14,294
15,139
15,632
16,310
15,809
16,127
16,446
16,498
15,571
15,438
15,516
15,401

24.2
27.9
29.1
30.3
30.2
28.4
30.2
32.6
33.6
33.7
33.3
32.4
34.2
33.3
32.3
31.6

U.S.

30.4
31.1
32.1
31.8
31.9
31.6
31.7
32.0
32.5
32.3
31.8
31.4
31.2
30.3
29.0
28.6
28.5

5. Brian A. Langille, Canadian Labour Law Reform and Free Trade (June 28, 1991)
(unpublished paper presented at the Law and Society Association meeting, in Amsterdam, Netherlands, on file with author).
6. DANIEL DRACHE & HARRY GLASBEEK, THE CHANGING WORKPLACE: RESHAPING
CANADA'S INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM 33 (1992) [hereinafter DRACHE & GLASBEEK].
7. Chart 3 is reproduced from Langille, supranote 5, at 8.
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Total Membership (000)

As a % of Non-Agricultural

Workers
Year

Canada

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983a
1983b
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

1,423
1,449
1,493
1,589
1,763
1,921
2,010
2,075
2,173
2,231
2,388
2,591
2,732
2,884
3,042
3,149
3,278
3,397
3,487
3,617
3,563
3,563
3,651
3,666
3,730
3,781
3,841
3,944
4,031

16,894
17,133
17,697
18,269
18,922
19,668
20,017
20,186
20,990
20,711
21,206
21,881
22,163
22,207
22,153
21,632
21,757
22,025
20,968
20,647
19,571
18,634
17,717
17,340
16,996
16,975
16,913
17,002
16,960
16,740

Canada

U.S.

30.2
29.8
29.4
29.7
30.7
32.3
33.1
32.5
33.6
33.6
34.6
36.1
35.8
36.9
37.3
38.2
39.0

30.4
30.2
30.2
30.1
29.6
29.9
29.5
28.7
29.6
29.1
28.8
28.5
28.3
28.9
27.9
26.2
25.1
24.5
23.2
22.6
21.9
20.7
20.4
19.1
18.3
17.8
17.0
17.0
16.4
16.1

37.6
37.4
39.0
40.0
40.0
39.6
39.0
37.7
37.6
36.6
36.2
36.2

It is common to use relative union density rates as a rough estimate of union strength. Obviously, though, the level of union organization is not the same as the measure of the impact of unions on
the political and economic system. Although serious questions have
8. Gary Chaison & Joseph Rose, The Macrodeterminants of Union Growth and
Decline, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 11 (George Strauss et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter
Chaison & Rose, Union Growth]. Between 1970 and 1977, Canadian unions gained a 24%
increase in membership although density declined by 1.7%. U.S. unions enjoyed a more
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been raised concerning the determination of actual density rates, 9
Canadian and United States rates are a reasonably accurate reflection of the scope of collective bargaining and the extent to which
employees are covered by collective agreements."°
EXPLANATIONS OF UNION DECLINE
There are many possible nonlegal explanations for the decline
of unionization in the United States. For example, many analyses
have pointed to cyclical variations in the economy, the closing or reduction of many plants in heavy industry where American union
strength has traditionally been centered, the increasing capital
transfer to less friendly environs in the south or southwest or the
shift of production abroad." Others stress changes in the nature of
modest gain and suffered a 3.4% drop in density. In the 1978-1985 period Canadian unions again had over a 20% gain but density remained constant. U.S. unions, however,
declined 15-25% in membership, depending upon which set of statistics is used, and suffered a 5-8% drop in density. See Robert Price, Trade Union Membership, in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STATISTICS: A HANDBOOK, GUIDE AND RECENT TRENDS 146, 154 (R.
Ronald Bean ed., 1989).
9. Serious issues of methodology have been raised about studies relying upon aggregate union membership data. Gary Chaison and Joseph Rose, for instance, believe that
union membership data are compiled from flawed sources, generally from union reports,
dues receipts or from household or firm surveys. The first may be intentionally inflated
and the second may include union or agency shop dues payers. Second, there are differences in national studies concerning which unions and employees to count as well as how
to estimate potential union members. The various Canadian data series, for instance,
"differ in the inclusion of small local independent unions and unaffiliated professional and
public employee associations." Chaison & Rose, Union Growth, supra note 8, at 7.
Changes in union density are not simply the result of successful organizing and bargaining efforts or of losses to technological or capital changes, because the pool of potential union members is important. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported in a review of
1989 membership data that "the number of union members has been virtually unchanged
since 1985, while employment has been increasing," thus accounting for the decline in
union density between 1985 and 1989. Id. at 9 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, NEWS:
UNION MEMBERS IN 1989 (1990)).

10. David Kettler et al., Unionization and Labour Regimes in Canada and the
United States: Considerationsfor Comparative Research, in 25 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 161
(1990). Leo Troy, however, argues that the structural realities in Canada and the United
States are not the same. First, he argues that Canada lags behind the United States by
more than a decade in changing from a goods- to a service-based economy. Moreover, he
argues that Canada has a far larger public labor market than the U.S. in relative terms
which is virtually immune from market forces. Leo Troy, Will a More Interventionist
NLRA Revive Organized Labor?, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 583 (1990); Leo Troy,
Market Forces and Union Decline: A Response to Paul Weiler, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 681
(1992). See also DRACHE & GLASBEEK, supra note 6, at 180-97. See infra text
accompanying note 23.
11. See, e.g., Leo Troy, Is the U.S. Unique in the Decline ofPrivate Sector Unionism?,
11 J. LAB. RES. 111 (1990); William Moore & Robert Newman, A Cross Section Analysis of

the PostwarDecline in American Trade Union Membership, 9 J. LAB. RES. 111 (1988).
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the workforce, especially the move from labor's traditional bases of
support to a workforce containing more white collar, service sector,
southern or women workers. Such analyses are based on assumptions of the difficulty of organizing these types of workers or, at
labor's historically limited success among such
least, organized
12
groups.
These analyses often omit any reference to the increasing concentration and mobility of capital. Yet, the growth of conglomerates
and multinational corporations drastically affect the power
relationships of labor and capital. As early as 1975, Charles Craypo
determined that at least fifteen percent of the leading 300 firms in
American manufacturing, including eight of the top fifty, were conglomerate, multi-national employers. 13 As I have noted elsewhere,
"[u]nions find themselves dealing increasingly with conglomerates
and multi-national corporations that can more easily weather economic struggles, conceal information, and transfer, or more credibly
threaten to transfer, work to other locales, or, indeed, other countries, than could their predecessor counterparts."'4 While the conglomerate form may not directly affect union density or success in
representation elections, the difficulties union face in terms of information and influence seem vital to union growth. More
importantly, concentration upon international aspects of capital
might weaken purely domestic explanations of labor's decline.
Nevertheless, some of the economic or social explanations for
labor decline, despite their straightforward attraction, have been
Jonathan Leonard has found, for instance, in a sample of California manufacturing
plants, that employment tends to grow more slowly in organized plants and this slower
growth "accounts for 61 percent of the decline... in the proportion of the (California
manufacturing) workforce unionized." Jonathan Leonard, Unions and Employment
Growth, 31 INDUS. REL. 80, 88 (1992). For a listing of studies on union growth and decline
see Chaison & Rose, Union Growth, supra note 8, at 12-36. See also WILLIAMI B. GOULD

IV,AGENDA

FOR REFORM, ch. 2 (1993); CHARLES CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 34-55

(1993).
12. Recent predictions suggest that if the rate of union decline continues, unions
may represent only five percent of the non-farm workforce by the year 2000. Such a decline would match in ten years the reduction experienced for the last 20 years. Predictions are always risky, and often fail to note that private employment may well grow at a
substantially reduced rate throughout the 1990s. In addition, the forces which buffeted
unions in the 1980s may not be repeated, i.e., the greatest fall in union density occurred
during the 1981-83 recession and the deregulation which occurred in the trucking and
airline industries. In addition, the tighter labor market projected for the 1990s may lead
to greater union organizing. See Charles McDonald, U.S. Trade Union Membership in
FutureDecades:A Trade Unionist'sPerspective, 31 INDUS. REL. 13, 15 (1992).
13. Charles Craypo, Collective Bargaining in the Conglomerate, Multi National
Firm:Litton's Shutdown ofRoyal Typewriter, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 7 (1975).
14. James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power and Society, 44 MD. L. REV. 841,
842 (1985) [hereinafter Atleson, Reflections].
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discounted. 5 For instance, one common explanation is that the
stronghold of unionism, older, male, blue collar workers employed in
manufacturing industries in the north, has constituted a declining
percentage of the workforce while other sectors, such as service industries with younger, female and white collar workers have grown,
often in geographic areas where the traditions of unionism are
weak. 16 Yet, white collar and service workers are not inherently opposed to collective bargaining nor have they been in Europe or Canada. Even in the United States, organization in the predominantly
white collar government sector has grown remarkably in the last 25
years. In addition, white collar organizations predominantly include
high in
female or service workers, but pro-union sentiments are
17
these groups, much higher than their rate of organization.
Michael Goldfield has forcefully argued that neither economic
nor demographic explanations can adequately explain labor's decline
and he, like others, stresses the role of American labor law which
makes union organization difficult.' 8 In focusing on some of the
economic explanations, Goldfield argues, for instance, that the
southwestern United States has actually been an area of "high
union success," although unionization in the U.S. has concededly
been primarily a regional phenomenon. As he notes, "in the
Northeast, the Midwest, and along the west coast, labor unions have
had until recently a density quite favorable in comparison to those
in other countries...."19
One of the arguments often raised to discount economic explanations is that Canada, with a workforce and industrial base similar
to the United States, has not experienced the same rapid decline in
union organization."° For instance, the AFL-CIO Committee on the
15. See, e.g., Henry Farber, The Extent of Unionization in the United States, in
CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FACING AIERICAN LABOR 15-43 (Thomas Kochan ed., 1985).
Farber argues that only about a quarter of the union decline between 1956 and 1978 can
be accounted for by shifts from manufacturing and toward white collar and female workers. See also Chaison & Rose, Union Growth, supra note 8,at 12-16. See also Richard
Freeman, Why Are Unions Faring Poorly in NLRB Representation Elections?, in
CHALLENGE AND CHOICES FACING AMERICAN LABOR 45,49-50 (Thomas Kochan ed., 1985).
16. See DANIEL BELL, THE COMvING OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 129-42 (1973);
THO uAS KOCHAN, COLLECTIE BARGAINING IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 71-76 (1980). But

see William T. Dickens & Jonathan S. Leonard, Accounting for the Decline in Union
Membership, 1950-1980, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 323 (1985) [hereinafter Dickens &
Leonard].
17. See Weiler, Promises, supra note 2, at 1773 n.6. Public sector unionization in
1992 exceeded 36%. 1993 AM. LAB. Y.B. 16 (1993).
18. GOLDFIELD, supra note 3, at 94-112.
19. Id. at 235. Goldfield also denigrates the importance of cyclical variations in the
economy or in the occupants of the White House. Id. at 224.
20. Indeed, unions in all industrialized countries faced unprecedented challenges in
the 1970s and 1980s due to the slowdown in growth, the shift from more highly unionized
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Evolution of Work stated that with "roughly the same kind of economy," "many similar employers," and comparable changes affecting
the labor market, "the percentage of the civilian labor force that is
organized [in Canada] increased in the period 1963-1983 from
roughly 30% to 40%, at the same time that the percentage of organized workers declined in the United States from 30% to 20%. "21 In
contrast to the continuing union decline in the U.S., many note that
the Canadian upturn in the early 1960s represents a long term phenomenon. [See Charts 1 and 3] In addition, some studies discount
the notion that the differences between the two countries can be explained by the type of industries present in each country. Indeed,
Noah Meltz found that "if Canada were more like the United States
would be a greater difference in
in its employment distribution there
22
the overall rates of organization."
The differences in union density in the two countries also cannot be explained by differences in occupational groups. It is true that
there is more extensive unionization of the public sector in Canada,
and this may account for a good deal of the seeming difference in
union rates in the two countries. Nevertheless, Meltz reports that
"all broad occupational sectors were more highly unionized in Canada in 1980 than in the U.S."23 Indeed in both countries there has
been a similar relative decline in the manufacturing sector and a
relative growth of government and service related sectors. But even
of unionization in the two countries reveals a sharp
so, the patterns
24
contrast.
Concededly, the problem with single country analyses is that
they may overlook cross-national economic forces. Indeed, since union density is declining in a number of industrialized nations, national discussions may overstress local factors. On the other hand,
sectors to traditionally lesser organized white collar and service industries and the internationalization of labor markets. Nevertheless, the precipitous decline in U.S. union
density rates was not matched in most continental European countries, Canada or Australia. David Blanchflower & Richard Freeman, Unionism in the United States and Other
Advanced OECD Countries,31 INDUS. REL. 56 (1992).
21. See Huxley, supranote 3, at 114.
22. Noah Meltz, Labor Movements in Canadaand the United States, in CHALLENGES
AND CHOICES FAcING A1iERICAN LABOR 315, 322 (Thomas Kochan ed., 1985). See also
Huxley, supra note 3, at 120.
23. Meltz, supra note 22, at 319.
24. Meltz noted that "[in both countries, had there been no other changes, the shift
in employment towards trade, finance, and service employees would have lowered overall
rates of unionization. A decrease did not occur in Canada because membership rates grew
in these industries and remained unchanged in the others. A net decline occurred in the
United States because the growth of unionization in trade, finance, service and govern-

ment was not sufficient to offset the declining rates of organization in the other sectors."
Meltz, supranote 22, at 319-22; see also Huxley, supranote 3, at 121.
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international forces do not explain why union decline in England,
Italy and France has not been matched in Sweden and Germany. 5
Although an explication of international market and technological
changes is beyond the scope of this article, the fact that union decline has not been pervasive suggests that institutional structures in
each nation constitute important variables.
Lowell Turner argues, on the other hand, that "changes in
world markets and new technologies are driving the reorganization
of production and the introduction of 'new production concepts,'
which increasingly decentralize labor-management negotiations and
undermine traditional national bases of union strength."2 Turner
concludes, however, that union influence remained stable in countries in which unions were "integrated into processes of managerial
decisionimaking, as in West Germany and Japan."27 When labor
participation is not established by law or integrated into managerial
decisionmaking, as in the U.S., unions have little political leverage
and are forced to deal with decentralized bargaining. Turner's thesis, therefore, stresses the effects of the new employer offensive, and
he relies, in part at least, on domestic factors to explain why international pressures have different national effects.
LEGAL REGULATION AND UNION DENSITY

Various authors conclude that the precipitous fall in American
union density is at least partly due to legal and administrative policies in the U.S. involving the enforcement of unfair labor practices or
the certification of unions as bargaining agents. Explicit or implicit,
these analyses tend to assume that labor law is more favorable to
union organization in other countries. More favorable legislation or
substantive rules in the U.S., it is argued, would blunt employer opposition and arrest the decline of American unions. 28 The obverse
25. Relative union density indicates that in selected OECD countries, only France
(at 13%) has a lower percentage of the working forces organized than the United States. A
1991 study found the U.S. at 17%, Japan at 27%, Germany 34%, Canada 36%, Italy 40%,
England 42% and Sweden at 85%. Jelle Visser, Trends in Trade Union Membership,
reprinted in Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for US? Employee
Representation in

a

Nonunion Labor Market, in

EMPLOYEE

ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13, 15 (Bruce E. Kaufnan

REPRESENTATION:

& Morris M. Kleiner

eds., 1993).
26. LOWELL TURNER, DEMOCRACY AT WORK: CHANGING WORLD MARKETS AND THE
FUTURE OF LABOR UNIONS 7 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1991). Changing managerial

strategies for reorganizing work have confronted unions with new challenges. At the
same time, unemployment and managerial resistance has weakened union ability to
protect jobs and secure increased purchasing power. Id. at 10.
27. Id. at 26.
28. For a discussion of the studies taking this position see Chaison & Rose, Union
Growth, supra note 8, at 20-22.
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argument is that the decline of American unions is due to relatively
less supportive labor laws or more hostile interpretations of existing
statutes.29
The use of law as an explanatory device is problematic. It is
perhaps odd to differ with social scientists on this point, but I tend
to believe that formal law is more of a reflection of societal pressures
or reality than a cause of social phenomena. This is not to say that
law has no effects of its own. When unions have sought to deal with
concentration of capital in conglomerate firms, for instance, the law
has provided serious obstacles. Unions have frequently sought to cooperate with other unions facing the same employer or to impose
economic pressure on non-struck parts of a conglomerate. Unions
learn, however, that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) often
bars attempts to equalize bargaining power for reasons that have
never been clearly expressed. Despite the professed aim of the
NLRA to equalize bargaining power, unions are informed that they
do not have a sufficient community of interest despite their own desire to seek joint protection and strength. In sum, American law
limits the extent to which the worker community can protect itself
against0 corporate structures that drastically alter power relation3

ships.

Moreover, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 restricted certain tactics, some of which were very effective when used for organizing or
29. An econometric study of the decline of union density in the United Kingdom
during the 1980s concludes that "the vast bulk of the observed 1980s decline in union
density in the U.K. is due to the changed legal environment for industrial relations."
Richard Freeman & Jeffrey Pelletier, The Impact of IndustrialRelations on British Union
Density, 28 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 142, 156 (1990) (emphasis omitted). Richard Freeman
and Jeffrey Pelletier find that the union decline in the United Kingdom, 1.4 percentage
point per year in the 1980s, cannot be explained by shifts in employment from highly unionized to less unionized groups of workers, worsening public opinion or to changes in
business cycle. Indeed, public opinion of unions rose in the 1980s and union density continued to fall during an economic upswing. Id. at 142-45. But see Richard Disney, Explanations of the Decline in Trade Union Density in Britain:An Appraisal, 28 BRIT. J. INDUS.
REL. 165-77 (1990).
30. See Atleson, Reflections, supra note 14. This is only one of many possible situations in which the labor law system varies from what Gunther Teubner calls a reflexive
approach. Reflexive law, he states, approaches problems from a procedural rather than a
substantive standpoint. Thus, "[i]t seeks to structure bargaining relations so as to equalize bargaining power," but the parties "are free to strike whatever bargains they will. Reflexive law affects the quality of outcomes without determining the agreements that will
be reached." Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17
LAW & Socy REV. 239, 256 (1983). Teubner clearly prefers a system of legal restraint to
one of "comprehensive regulation of substantive legal rationality." Id. at 274. An American labor lawyer would recognize the "reflexive potential" in U.S. collective bargaining
law, for the privatization of contractual solutions has long been a staple of industrial relations theory. Yet, although outcomes are shaped by power relations, power is shaped
and restricted by the same legal system.
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bargaining.3 ' Mass picketing3 2 and, especially, certain kinds of secondary pressure were outlawed,33 and hot cargo agreements were
barred by the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959. 3 Importantly, a mandatory injunction provision" was included for certain union unfair labor practices, and the amendments also provided a damage remedy
against unions permitting employers to bring actions directly to federal courts, skirting the NLRB entirely. These amendments, especially the secondary boycott provisions, forced unions to focus primarily on the struck firm during the period when the conglomerate
form was becoming more common.36
Restrictive legislation such as the Taft-Hartley Act or hostile
NLRBs also have symbolic effects, making organization psychologically more difficult.37 Furthermore, it is impossible to oppose the ar31. President Truman's veto message stated his belief that Taft-Hartley would convert the NLRA "from an instrument with the major purpose of protecting the rights of
workers to organize and bargain collectively into a maze of pitfalls and complex procedures." 93 CONG. REc. 7500 (1947) reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 915, 915 (1947). The bill, he stated, would
deprive workers of "vital protections which they now have under the Law" and "would go
far toward weakening our trade union movement." Id. at 915, 1921.
32. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)
(1988).

33. Labor

Management

Relations

(Taft-Hartley) Act

§ 301(a),

29

U.S.C.

§ 158(b)(4)(D) (1988).

34. Labor Management Relations (Landrum-Griffin) Act 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988).
35. Labor Management Relations (Landrum-Griffin) Act 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1988).
36. There is some reason to believe, however, that the American focus on single-employer bargaining precedes the Taft-Hartley Act. Jeffrey Haydu of the Department of Sociology at Syracuse argues that the victory of the open shop movement in most American
enterprises before WWI meant that by the 1930s most firms administered labor relations
by professional managers at the plant level. By this time, labor policies had long been negotiated on an industry-wide basis in many European industries. Once American unions
did gain recognition, the development of personnel management tended to favor singleemployer bargaining. The employer's structure of rules became the subject of bargaining
at the plant level. When negotiations occur at the plant level, and competitive pressures
arise, employers are pitted more directly against unions. Jeffrey Haydu, TradeAgreement
vs. Open Shop: Employers' Choices Before WWI, 28 INDUS. REL. 159, 171 (1989).
37. A major part of the law's impact may be through the psychological/symbolic
effect passage of a RTW (right-to-work) law may have on workers. Successful organization requires that a few workers inside a plant take a highly visible and
activist role. The costs to these activists can be enormous, ranging from harassment to loss of their jobs. Even those who are not activists must take the highly
visible step of signing an authorization card. And in considering whether or not
to vote for a union, workers often fear they will lose their jobs or suffer other
costs if their company is hostile. Thus the perceived strength of the union may
be critical to the willingness of activists and others to become involved in an organizing drive. A highly visible defeat such as the passage of RTW law (or the
crushing of PATCO) may severely damage the union's credibility and appeal to
workers. There is at least some evidence that the psychological impact may be
important. In Missouri, for example, after a RTW law was defeated, new organ-
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gument that the Reagan Board was especially unsympathetic to unions.
Many aspects of the Reagan era seem incredible in retrospect and,
indeed, seemed incredible at the time. It would have been inconceivable, one would have thought, for a Republican administration to refuse to renew a black Republican on the labor board and,
even more incredibly, to actually appoint as solicitor a prior staff
counsel of the National Right to Work Association.
The Reagan Board, however, routinely based its reversals of
prior holdings on decisions of the past. Some previous Boards could
legitimately be characterized as less than sympathetic to the goals of
the Act, although one would have to go back at least to the 1950s to
find one even approaching this level of unconcern 2 8 Yet, the difference is one of degree, for the courts, usually the appellate courts and
recently the Supreme Court, have historically restricted the potential scope of the Act. 9 A limited historical focus, therefore, tends to
exaggerate the effects of recent decisionmaking.
Thus, although U.S. labor law has obviously negatively affected
union vitality, the problem is linking labor's decline primarily to
these changes or weaknesses in substantive law. One of the leading
voices for reform of American labor law is Paul Weiler. Like others,
Weiler places much of the blame for labor's current decline on the
National Labor Relations Act, the NLRB, and the continued opposition of American employers to unionism. Although many things affect a worker's decision to vote for a union, Weiler persuasively explains the pressures often brought to bear on the worker at the time
the decision is made and the ineffective response of the law.4" The
number of workers certified by NLRB elections as a percentage of
the private, nonagricultural workforce fell steadily from 0.61 percent
in 1966 to 0.09 percent in 1986."' In addition, as Chart 4 indicates,
the average number of workers won by unions per election has also
izing jumped dramatically.
DAVID T. ELLWOOD & GARY A. FINE, THE IMPACT OF RIGHT-To-WORK LAWS ON UNION
ORGANIZING 32 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1116, 1983).
See also, Carl Gersuny, Citizenship and Labor Relations, 3 EMPLOYER REsPs. & RTS. J.
185, 191 (1990).
38. As noted by Carl Gersuny, "[diuring the year beginning in September 1983,
when Reagan appointees first comprised a majority of the National Labor Relations
Board, '60 percent of contested unfair labor practice and representation complaints were
decided in favor of the employer' and that ratio rose to 65% in the first quarter of 1985."
Gersuny, supra note 37, at 191 (quoting AFL-CIO News). The ratios under Presidents
Ford and Carter were 29% and 27%respectively. Id.
39. See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW

(1983) [hereinafter ATLESON, ASSUMPTIONS].
40. See Weiler, Promises,supra note 2. See also Goldfield, supra note 3, at 197.
41. MARCUS REBICK, CRUMBLING PILLAR? DECLINING UNION DENSITY IN JAPAN
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2963, 1989).
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dropped,4 2 and the union victory rate in U.S. certification elections
fell from 74% in 1950 to 48% in 1980. 43 Again, note that the 1950 to
1955 period is the point at which union density in the U.S. begins its
long, steady fall.
CHART 444
THE CONTRIBUTION OF NLRB ELECTIONS TO UNION GROWTH,

1950-1980

Certification
Elections

Union
Victory

Fraction of
Voters (Number
of voters) in

Fraction of
Nonagric. Work
Force in Union

Year

(Eligible voters)

Rate

Union Victories

Victories

1950

5619

74%

85%

1.92%

(753,598)

(890,368)
1955

4215

68%

73%

0.87%

(378,962)

(515,995)

1960

6380
(483,964)

59%

59%
(286,048)

0.62%

1965

7576

61%

61%

0.64%

(325,698)

(531,971)
1970

7773

56%

52%

0.53%

(307,104)

(588,214)

1975

8061
(545,103)

50%

38%
(208,313)

0.33%

1980

7296
(478,821)

48%

37%
(174,983)

0.24%

42. See Chaison & Rose, Union Growth, supranote 8, at 26-27.
43. Although the Bush NLRB has been more accommodating to labor than the prior
Reagan Board, changes in legal doctrine have been modest. Nevertheless, in 1989 "a nine
year high was reached in the number of employees organized via the NLRB. The win rate
of 49.5 percent was a 14-year high." McDonald, supra note 12, at 16. Recent NLRB data,
analyzed by the research division of the Bureau of National Affairs, indicates that unions
won more elections, and more employees secured union representation, in the first half of
1992. Although the number of representation elections continued to fall, unions won 49.5
percent of the 1,324 elections held in the first half of 1992. The rate increased 5.2 percent
from the corresponding period in 1991. The increased win rate resulted in a corresponding increase, 26.5 percent, in employees winning representation rights. See 141 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 312 (Nov. 9, 1992).
44. Chart 4 is reproduced from Weiler, Promises,supra note 2, at 1776.
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The failure of union election victories to maintain or increase
union density may be explained by continued or even renewed employer resistance which has never dissipated despite the hopes of
the Wagner Act's drafters in 1935. Without discounting employer
opposition, Weiler argues that "the decline in union success in representation campaigns is in large part attributable to deficiencies in
the law."45 Specifically, he argues that employees are not adequately
protected from employer pressure and violations of the Act during
election campaigns. Whereas one well-known empirical study suggested that the election campaign has little effect upon employee
voting,46 there is a substantial amount of empirical data to suggest
that employer violations of the Act have had very damaging effects.
Certainly the most stunning figure in the welter of numbers
generated by the debate over the role of law in union decline is the
finding that nearly 40 percent of currently nonunion, non-managerial employees said that they would not join a union because of company pressure.4 7 Moreover, a 1988 Gallop poll found that employees
campaign would produce sigbelieved that a union representation
48
nificant tension in their workplaces.
In election campaigns, which usually last between a month and
a half to two months, employers often mount vigorous campaigns to
persuade employees to vote against the union. The referendum often
focuses not upon the willingness of employees to seek collective
representation but, rather, whether they wish to maintain their
employment. The evidence clearly establishes that both employer
resistance and unlawful activity have increased. Thus, as Weiler
notes, "[p]erhaps the most remarkable phenomenon in the
representation process in the past quarter-century has been an
astronomical increase in unfair labor practices by employers." 49 As
Charts 5 and 6 indicate, there has been a stunning and disturbing
rise in employer violations since 1957 especially involving
discharges of union activists. "From 1957 to 1965, unfair labor
practice charges against employers increased by 200%, while the
number of certification elections increased by only 50%."50 As
indicated by Chart 5, the number of certification elections was
slightly lower in 1980 than 1965, but between 1965 and 1980 unfair
45. Weiler, Promises, supranote 2, at 1776-77.
46. See JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND
REALITY 72 (1976).
47. Paul C. Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The WagnerAct at Fifty, 23 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 11 & n.18 (1986).
48. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 117 n.25 (1990) [hereinafter
WEILER, GOVERNING].
49. Weiler, Promises, supranote 2, at 1778.
50. Id. at 1779-80.
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labor practice charges against employers increased another 200%.
This first increase clearly occurred before the internationalization of
markets and subsequent pressure on U.S. manufacturers. Moreover,
the percentage of these charges found meritorious by the NLRB
remained roughly constant. The conclusion is inescapableemployers are increasingly violating employees' rights, especially
the right to engage in union activities. Even the increase in back pay
awards, noted in Chart 6, has not stemmed the tide of employer
lawlessness.
CHART 5
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BY EMPLOYERS 5 1
Charges
Against
Employers

§8(a)3
Charges

Fraction
Found
Meritorious

Backpay
Awards
(Average
Amount)

Year

Certification
Elections

1950

5619

4472

3213

NA

2259
($477)

2111

1955

4215

4362

3089

NA

1836
($428)

1275

1957

4729

3655

2789

NA

1457
($354)

922

1960

6380

7723

6044

29.1%
(overall)

3110
($335)

1885

1965

7576

10,931

7367

35.5%
(overall)

4644
($599)

5875

1970

7773

13,601

9290

34.2%
(overall)

6828
($403)

3779

1975

8061

20,311

13,426

32.3%
(employer)

7405
($1524)

3816

15,642
($2054)

10,033

Reinstatees

30.2%
(overall)
1980

7296

31,281

18,315

39.0%
(employer)
35.7%
(overall)

51. This chart appears in Weiler, Promises, supranote 2, at 1780.
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CHART 6

EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO UNIONS AS REFLECTED
IN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES, 1950-198052

Year

Section
8(a)(1)

Section
8(a)(3)

1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1974
1975
1976
1976q
1977
1978
1979
1980

4,472
4,362
7,723
10,931
13,601
17,978
20,301
23,496
6,223
26,105
27,056
29,026
31,281

3,213
3,089
6,024
7,367
9,290
11,620
13,426
15,090
3,982
16,697
17,220
17,220
18,317

Reinstatees

Number of
Backpay
Cases

Backpay
Amount
(thousands)

$1,078
2,259
2,111
785
1,836
1,275
1,041
3,110
1,885
2,699
4,530
1,875
2,639
6,706
3,779
8,156
6,800
4,778
11,286
7,405
3,816
11,636
7,238
4,442
(the transitional quarter)
17,373
7,552
4,458
13,439
8,623
5,533
16,538
14,627
5,837
32,136
15,566
10,033

Employees entitled to reinstatement in 1980 numbered over
10,000, a 1000% increase from the lowest point in 1957. What is
most important is that the "merit" factor, that is, the percentage of
cases in which the Board found that a violation had occurred, increased substantially over this period of time. [Chart 5] In other
words, not only are more unfair labor practice charges being filed
against employers, but a higher percentage of them are found to be
meritorious. In 1980, for example, about 10,000 employees were unlawfully fired for their involvement in unionizing efforts. In that
year, unions obtained less than 200,000 votes in representation
elections. Weiler concludes: "Astoundingly, then, the current odds
are about one in twenty that a union supporter will be fired for exercising rights supposedly guaranteed by federal law a half-century
ago."53 These are, I should add, conservative numbers for they ex52. Reproduced from GOLDFIELD, supra note 3, at 196.
53. Id. at 1781. Robert LaLonde and Bernard Meltser challenge Weiler's one in
twenty assessment, but they nevertheless concede that there has been a sharp increase in

the number of discharged union supporters since the mid-seventies. Overall, however, the
authors challenge the thesis that employer actions or the state of labor law account either
for the falling union success rate in elections or the decline in union density. Robert J.
LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltser, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance
of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953 (1991). See also Paul C. Weiler, Hard
Times for Unions: ChallengingTimes for Scholars, 58 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1015 (1991).
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elude those employees who did not file charges, and the large number of employees who settle for a monetary award prior to any holding by an administrative law judge or the Board that the employee
had a right to reinstatement.5 4
Recent studies indicate that employer unfair labor practices affect the outcome of representation elections. William Dickens, for
instance, studied attitudinal data from 966 workers participating in
31 elections from 1972-73. Using a simulation model, he found that
unions would win 53-67% of the time if employers engaged in a
modest anti-union campaign. With an intense anti-union campaign,
however, Dickens found only a 22-34% chance of union victory. If the
employer violated the NLRA, moreover, there was only a 4-10%
chance of winning. 5 Other recent studies support these findings. For
instance, a study of 130 elections in retail grocery outlets indicates
that the use of employer consultants decreased the probability of
union victory, at least to the extent that it altered the outcome in
closely contested elections.56
Finally, and most relevant, other studies have tried to explain
why unions, after successfully winning certification rights in Board
elections, fail to secure a collective agreement in one out of every
four first contract negotiations. William Cooke found that employer
discrimination against union activists and unlawful refusals to bargain had substantial negative effects on the probability that a first
contract would be reached. Negative effects also resulted from the
lengthy delay in the NLRB's resolution of employee challenges to
lost elections. In a study of one NLRB region, for instance, Cooke
found that the incidence of one or more discrimination violations
substantially reduced the probability that an agreement would be
reached. Moreover, in 17% of his sample, the union filed meritorious
charges of discriminatory behavior."
In 1969 the Supreme Court upheld the NLRB's decision to
permit employers confronted with a union's presentation of signed
authorization cards to ignore this evidence of majority support and
demand an election. No longer would the NLRB inquire into an
54. See JAMES B. ATLESON ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
333-34 (2d ed. 1984).

55. See William T. Dickens, Union Representation Elections: Campaign and Vote
(1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dep't. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of

Technology) (cited in Weiler, Promisesto Keep, supra note 2, at 1784-86). See also William
T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaignson CertificationElections: Law and Reality
Once Again 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV, 560-75 (1983) [hereinafter Dickens, Effect].

56. See John J. Lawlor, The Influence ofManagement Consultants on the Outcome of
Union CertificationElections, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 38-51 (1984).
57. WILLIAi N. COOKE, UNION ORGANIZING AND PUBLIC POLICY: FAILURE TO SECURE
UNION CONTRACTS 98 (1985).

58. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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employer's "good faith belief' that the cards did or did not accurately
reflect the wishes of a majority of employers. Even the discarded
"good faith" test had restricted the seeming scope of the NLRA's requirement that employers bargain with a representative "designated
or selected.., by the majority of the employees."5 9 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself recognized in Gissel that "a union is not limited to
a Board election," and "it was early recognized that an employer had
a duty to bargain whenever the union representative presented
'convincing evidence of majority support.'" 60 The Court seemed unaware of the conflict between this recognition and its decision upholding of the NLRB's new approach. Indeed, the Court made clear
five years later that even a strike for recognition by a majority of
employees would not be sufficient to require mandatory recognition.6 '
Instead, the NLRB, with the Court's support, virtually guaranteed that representation questions will be settled by elections. The
result is seemingly based upon the dubious proposition that the outcome of elections will more accurately reflect workers' uncoerced will
than their signed authorization cards. In assuming the existence of
union or group pressure to sign authorization cards, the courts seem
oblivious to the more obviously perceived risks of card signing.
Instead, the safety valve in the new approach was that, should an
employer commit unfair labor practices during the election
campaign so serious that an election and the use of NILRB remedies
could not erase the effects and insure a "fair election," the NLRB
could issue a bargaining order if the union had secured majority
support before the election.
The standard sounded fair as worded, but how would the Board
ever prove that the effects of employer unfair labor practices could
not be erased by normal remedies and a new election? One could
have predicted difficulties, especially in the appellate courts where
the unreliability of authorization cards has long been a staple of
faith. Indeed, we have Judge Gibbons of the Third Circuit to thank
for explaining the inability of the NLRB to successfully justify
bargaining orders in some courts. Gibbons noted in an extraordinary
dissent that "at least a significant minority of the members of this
court believe that the Supreme Court... in [Gissel] erred."6 2 His
court, said Gibbons, was engaging in "guerrilla warfare"63 because
59. National Labor Relations Act §9(a), 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (1988).

60. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596.
61. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
62. NLRB v. K & K Gourmet Foods, Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 470 (1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 471.
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"the real concern is for employers."6
Yet, even if a bargaining order under Gissell is granted, the order is a weak reed upon which to build a strong, credible bargaining
position. A study of 49 bargaining orders granted between January
1981 and July 1984 found that contracts were reached in only 19
(39%) of the cases. 6 These figures could be interpreted in various
ways but should be compared to the 78% success rate for first
negotiation situations following certifications.
Certainly these studies indicate that the outcome of elections
and the securing of first collective bargaining agreements is affected
by employer resistance and unfair labor practices. This suggests
that the law does not serve as a very effective deterrence and, just as
importantly, that the remedial measures of the Board are not sufficient to overcome the value to employers of unlawful action.6" Employee willingness to join unions is in part a reflection of the costs or
risks of such action. In a 1984 Harris poll of nonunion workers, 43%
believed that their employer would either discharge or otherwise
6
discriminate against union supporters in an organizing campaign. 1
Thus, it is certainly reasonable to argue that the open resistance of
American employers to unionization plays a substantial role in employee decisions. 8
Although these studies indicate that legal rules may affect the
success rate of union organizational drives, the relationship of increased employer resistance to falling density is nevertheless problematic. Despite the hostility of the Reagan Board and recent economic developments:
a union's chances of winning representation elections has changed remarkably little. In the 1973-78 period, unions won approximately 47 percent of all private sector representation elections and in the 1980s,
through the first half of 1988, unions won approximately 45-48 percent of

all representation elections. Despite all the changes in the economy, the
composition and philosophy of the Board, the commission of unfair labor
practices and delay in case
processing, unions have fared nearly the same
69
during the entire period.

64. Id. at 474.
65. Benjamin W. Wolkinson et al., The Remedial Efficacy of Gissel BargainingOrder, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 509, 514 (1989).

66. Paul Weiler's argument is that given the strong resistance of employees to unions, labor law's failure to constrain employers "bears a substantial share of the responsibility for the general decline of unionization." WEELER, GOVERNING, supra note 48, at
118.
67. Id. at 114.
68. Id.
69. David Weinstein, Reforming the National Labor Relations Act: A Cautionary
Note, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 219, 228 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
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Furthermore, Dickens and Leonard conclude that "even if unions had continued to win representation rights for the same percentage of voters in certification elections as they did in 1950-54,
their share of employment would still have fallen over this period
[1954-1980] nearly as much as it actually did." 70 Although some believe that union election success or failure is an essential component

in the decline in union density,71 other scholars, like Robert Fla-

nagan, argue that "the results of representation elections have only
a small bearing on the growth of union membership," noting that
changes in employment levels at organized firms, plant closures and
union organizational activity affect density and, indeed, have
"contributed to the decline of union membership."72 In turn, however, union success rates, affected by the legal regulatory structure,
may well have an impact on the volume and intensity of labor's organizational efforts.
The "employer opposition" explanation for labor's decline has
been attacked most strongly by Leo Troy who argues that private
sector unionism will continue to erode irrespective of amendments to
the NLRA, primarily because of structural changes in the American
economy and increased foreign and domestic competition. Troy
challenges the notion that employer hostility is a relevant factor,
relying instead on "the invisible hand of other market forces."73 The
70. The authors conclude that "only if both organizing and success rates had continued at their early 1950s level could the unions have come close to maintaining their share
of the work force." Dickens & Leonard, supra note 16, at 323, 332. The challenge facing
unions is revealed by one astounding statistic-to reach the previous levels of union organization of 35%, unions would have to recruit 23 million new members. AA1. LAB. Y.B. 1993, 16 (1993).
71. Richard B. Freeman, Why Are Unions FaringPoorly in NLRB Representation
Elections?, in CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FACING AMERICAN LABOR 45 (Thomas A. Kochan

ed., 1985).
72. Robert J. Flanagan, The Economics of Unions and Collective Bargaining 29
INDUs. REL. 300, 308 (1990). In 1991 unions won election victories in bargaining units totaling over 62,000 workers. When, however, this number is reduced to account for decertification elections, agency shops, and situations in which no first collective agreement is
obtained, only a net of 23,400 new workers are represented via elections. In the same
year, more than 195,000 union jobs were lost. If labor wins every NLRB representation
vote at the "current pace of organizing and brings every worker under contract, it would
add roughly 180,000 new members a year - yet union density would still fall." 61 ECON.
NOTES (Lab. Res. Ass'n.) 7 (April, 1993).
73. Leo Troy, supra note 10, at 583. See also Leo Troy, Market Forces and Union
Decline:A Response to Paul Weiler, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1992). Troy states that when
the United States shifted from a goods-dominated to a private service-dominated economy
in the 1950s, density declined because services were largely non-unionized. In addition,
international competitive forces, accelerated by the high exchange rate of the dollar from
1979 to 1985, have devastated the organized manufacturing industries, and the decline in
the exchange rate of the dollar after 1985 has not helped as foreign output from foreignowned companies or U.S.-owned companies abroad has continued to provide significant
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effect of legal rules may be overstated, but it is doubtful that the law
is "irrelevant." Troy's strongly supported analysis usefully directs
attention away from an exclusive NLRA focus, but it assumes that
the "market" somehow exists independent of legal regulation and
public policy. Moreover, Troy's stress on employee opposition to union membership seems to ignore the climate of fear and uncertainty
caused by employer opposition and governmental hostility which
have been made crystal clear over the past twelve years to even the
most inattentive observer. Moreover, the "employee resistance" argument fails to account for the relative success of public sector
unions operating in a sphere where employer resistance to unionization is often minimal.
LABOR LAw IN CANADA
Canadian federal and provincial labor statutes are more supportive of union organization and generally provide more effective
remedies. In most Canadian jurisdictions, for instance, certification
of a bargaining agent results from a simple count of membership
cards. In those jurisdictions which do require a vote, the election is
held soon after the application for certification is filed, perhaps 5-10
days.74 Just as important, the law of the federal sector and five
provinces provide for binding arbitration if the parties are unable to
negotiate an agreement following union certification. 5 Canadian
legislation generally gives public agents greater power to regulate
and enforce unfair labor practices and stronger mandates to foster
union growth. Thus, Peter Bruce notes that:
Canadian labor boards have the authority to: (a) certify unions without
formal union representation elections; (b)make quick and final decisions
in ULP cases with little intervention from the courts; and (c)
impose first
contracts when employers refuse to bargain with newly certified unions.
Compared to the U.S., Canadian labor laws also have given public sector
workers more rights to strike, to compulsory arbitration, and to bargain

over wages. Numerous studies show that these institutions have curbed
employer ULPs more effectively and have given workers in Canada more

competition for U.S.-located manufacturers. He argues that even if unions had not lost
one member since peaking at 17 million members in 1970, its market share today would

still be only about 18 percent, less than in 1937, and only about one-half of its all time
peak in 1953. He denies that the U.S. has suffered deindustrialization, but argues that
there has been a large scale deunionization of its industrial base.
74. H. P. Ralph & Mark Crestohl, The Union Knocks at the Door: The CanadianPerspective, 41 LAB. L.J. 569, 570 (1990) [hereinafter Ralph & Crestohli. For a detailed discussion of Canadian labor law see GOULD, supranote 11, at ch. 7.
75. Ralph & Crestohl, supranote 74, at 574.
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In Ontario, for instance, the most industrialized and populated
Canadian province since 1930, containing 35% of Canada's unionized workers, judicial review is limited, unions may be certified
without elections, 77 and the burden of proof is placed on management in discrimination cases, a development that would be considered extremely radical in the United States. Ontario also permits
strikers to reclaim their jobs for up to six months after the beginning
of the strike, even if replacements hired in the interim must be let
go. 7 8 In the U.S., however, strikers who exercise the statutory "right"
to strike under NLRA section 7 can be permanently replaced. 9
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

But if Canada's laws are generally more effective, more pro-organization, we have to ask how this situation arose. We cannot assume that one nation's laws can be transported to another to produce similar results despite cultural differences for those cultural
differences may explain why legal systems are distinctive. 0 Assuming Canada's statutes are more supportive of union organization,
and even accepting the notion that the law affects union density
rates, the critical issue is why Canada is more hospitable, and the
U.S. more hostile, to unions. One thing seems clear-it is not because of national differences in public opinion. Concededly, the sympathetic light in which American unions were viewed in the 1930s
76. Peter G. Bruce, PoliticalParties and LaborLegislation in Canadaand the U.S.,
28 INDUS. REL. 115, 122 (1989) (citations omitted); RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L.
MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS Do? 20-21 (1984); Ralph & Crestohl, supra note 74. Canadian
labor law is not without its critics. See, e.g., DRACHE AND GLASBEEK, supra note 6, at 5797.
77. See Donald C. Carter, Collective BargainingLegislation in Canada,in UNIONMANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN CANADA 25, 35 (John C. Anderson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989).
78. WEILER, GOVERNING, supra note 48, at 268. A 1992 statute enacted by the newly
elected New Democratic Party government in Ontario provides even greater protection
for union organizing. Act of Nov. 5, 1992, ch. 21, 1992 S.O. 363.
79. This doctrine is criticized in ATLESON, ASSUMPTIONS, supranote 39.
80. Seymour Martin Lipset has argued that the critical differences between Canada
and the United States lie in basic values: while Canada is "a more elitist, communitarian,
statist and particularistic society," the U.S. is premised upon "anti-statism, individualism
and competitive meritocracy." Seymour M. Lipset, North American Labor Movements: A
ComparativePerspective, in UNIONS IN TRANSITION: ENTERING THE SECOND CENTURY 421,
442-44 (Seymour M. Lipset ed., 1986). J.F. Conway argues that the analyses in Lipset's
own volume counters any such assertion and poses description as analysis and explanation. See J.F. Conway, Canadaand the US: What Makes Us Different?A Response to Seymour Martin Lipset, 28 LABoUR/LE TRAVAIL 311 (1991). Conway argues the key differences have "more to do with pragmatic successes in popular struggles than with founding
myths and their ideological packages." Id. at 317.
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no longer exists. In 1981, for instance, the approval/disapproval
rating of labor unions (55%/35%) in U.S. polls stood at the lowest
level since the Gallop Poll first asked that question in 1936. In ratings of the perceived ethical and moral practices of various occupational groups in the early 1980s, labor leaders ranked at the bottom,
although recent public opinion polls reflect more support for unions.8 1
These views could be based on a belief that unions are part of
the reason for the U.S. economic decline, the perceived lack of internal democracy in unions or the feeling that union corruption is rampant. I suspect the latter, but AFL-CIO representatives believe that
polls do not show that public views of possible corruption affect approval rates. I am somewhat skeptical-the pre-Carey Teamsters, I
would think, have affected the way Americans think of unions. The
parade of union officials before congressional committees in the late
1950s, the Kennedy-Hoffa wars, and widely disseminated pictures of
officials like the late Teamster President Jackie Presser being carried into a Las Vegas convention & la Julius Caesar, no doubt leave
indelible albeit misleading impressions on the American mind. Interestingly, reports of employers who negligently or intentionally
kill, maim or damage the environment do not seem to have the same
effect on the perceptions Americans have of corporations.
It would be a mistake, however, to overstress public opinion, as
if it were a valid starting point for considering national differences
or labor's decline. Public perceptions, after all, are also formed by the
media, which has never been sympathetic to unions. This concern is
part of a larger problem involving the increasing concentration of
control over the avenues of communication. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the media is a prime force in constricting the range
of discourse in America.8 2 The spectrum of political debate is ex81. Public opinion shifts, and the public is not immune to the impact on labor of the
events of the past decade. A Roper Poll released in February, 1990, prepared for the AFLCIO Executive Council, indicated that 50% of Americans had a "high" or "fairly good"
opinion of labor leaders compared with 37% in 1982. Stockbrokers and politicians ranked
below labor leaders. An increasing number felt that unions "need to do a great deal more
to improve the quality of life for workers." The number who felt excessive union demands
make the cost of living rise too much fell from 60% in 1981 to 40%. In addition, 33%, as
compared with 28% in 1977, said they instinctively side with unions when they learn of a
strike. This is the highest level of support for unions received since Roper began asking
these questions over 12 years ago. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRs, Labor Image Improves,
Roper Poll Shows, 133 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 273 (Mar. 5, 1990).
Recent scandals in the political and financial arena may account for some of these results, combined with the lack of any newsworthy labor corruption stories. But it may not
be a coincidence that the last two years has involved a resurgence of labor militance at,
for instance, Pittston, International Paper, Hormel and Eastern Airlines.
82. Television and the press are the prime means of communication, but these avenues are accessible only to those groups able to reach into deep pockets. The media, unfortunately, tends to be controlled by a handful of persons who have similar viewpoints,
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tremely narrow, and media attention to unions tends to stress the
"problems" they cause and, more recently, their serious reduction in
both size and power. These perceptions are important because they
affect the likelihood that Congress or the courts will respond affirmatively to employee and union concerns.
Although the drop in the public approval rating of unions is
important, Chart 7 indicates that approval of unions is not higher in
Canada. Indeed, Peter Bruce notes that Canada's proportion of
favorable attitudes to unions has generally been 5% or more below
that of the United States. In sum, Bruce states that as far as prounion sentiments are concerned, "Canadians have consistently been
3
less favorable than people in the United States."
CHART 78
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS UNIONS IN CANADA AND THE U.S.
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and, increasingly, a smaller handful. See Atleson, Reflections, supra note 14, at 841.
83. See Peter Bruce, supra note 76, at 115-41. Indeed, "public attitudes are not
significantly different among countries with declining and stable union density rates."
Chaison & Rose, Union Growth, supra note 8, at 30.
84. Bruce, supranote 76, at 120.
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Thus, the Canadian unions seem to have been more successful
and seem to have gained more favorable legislation, even though
their public approval rating is no higher than in the United States.
One must obviously look elsewhere for an explanation. Even if it
were otherwise, there is not always a clear connection between public opinion and the responses of legislatures, courts or administrative agencies.
BLAMING THE VICTIM: THE DECLINE IN UNION ORGANIZING

If differences in national approval rates cannot explain relative
union success, one might focus on the behavior of American unions.
Many American unions do seem to be less aggressive and socially
conscious than unions in other western societies, although they have
historically been very militant, and the U.S. strike rates have often
been higher than those of western Europe. United States labor history has also been filled with instances of violence, although much of
this violence has been due to the opposition of employers and the
intervention of the state. The state has often intervened in repressive ways, and in a manner that would be anathema in Europe. And,
it is almost cich6 to add, American employers are more strongly resistant to unions than employers elsewhere.85
It is relevant that in the 1950s, at the time when the union
decline in the United States began, unions started to reduce their
expenditures on union organization. At the same time, the composition of the work force began to change dramatically, in directions
which created problems for established unions.8 6 As noted earlier,
unions have traditionally been weakly represented in white collar
and service industries. In addition, unions were not well positioned
to meet the challenge of the growth of southern industry.87 In the
1970s and 1980s, unions suffered great losses, especially in the
heavily unionized manufacturing centers of the north and east.
Employers, at the same time, seem to have become more interested
in worker morale and satisfaction, partly to motivate and retain
85. See generally Clyde Summers, Worker Participationin Sweden and the United
States: Some Comparisonsfrom an American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 175 (1984).
86. Richard Edwards and Michael Podgursky believe that union difficulties derive
"from a process of institutional decay and transition that is more general and long lived
than would be suggested by focusing only on high unemployment and industrial decline."
Richard Edwards & Michael Podgursky, The UnravelingAccord: American Unions in Cri.
sis, in UNIONS IN CRISES AND BEYOND: PERSPECTIVES FROM SIX COUNTRIES 15 (Richard
Edwards et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter Edwards & Podgursky].
87. "Had the organizing and success rate held constant, most of the secular decline
in the unionized share of the labor force would have been arrested." Id. at 17-18. It cannot, obviously, be known whether continued expenditure levels for organization would
have been successful in terms of maintaining union density.
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workers, and partly to lessen the chance that workers would choose
unionization as the vehicle for workplace improvements.
Yet, union organizing efforts decreased substantially in the
1970s and 1980s.88 Freeman and Medoff conclude that "possibly as
much as a third of the decline of union success through NLRB elections is linked to reduced organizing activity."8 9 Indeed, union organizing expenditures per nonunion worker fell 9% between 1953 and
1960, and between 1961 and 1971 they dropped another 21%. Although gains were made among governmental workers, these successes did not offset the decline of organized workers as a percentage
of the work force, a percentage which fell from 26% to 21% between
1970 and 1980.11 It is also in the 1950s that many union activists,
often possessing a far broader social vision than remaining union leaders, were removed from the workforce by McCarthyism, either directly
or as a defensive measure by unions. 91
American unions operate in a system far more hostile than in
any other western democracy. American employers have always
been hostile to union organization, and they often act in ways that
shock European observers. Moreover, with the exception of the
Wagner Act in 1935, the federal and state governments have often
been hostile to union organization, and in some instances acting
through the militia, the army or courts have actively suppressed labor movements. There is no doubt, however, that employer opposition increased in the 1970s and 1980s when employers no longer
saw the advantages of the post-war "labor accord" outweighing the
disadvantages.9 2 American employers shifted to a more militant union posture, including fervent, often illegal opposition to union organization, greater assertiveness in bargaining, and strategies in
personnel relations intended to blunt the attractiveness of unionism
to employees. In Canada, on the other hand, union acceptance gen93
erally exists among large Canadian firms.
88. See Michael Wallace, Aggressive Economism, Defensive Control: Contours of
American LaborMilitancy, 1947-81, 10 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 7-34 (1989).
89. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 76, at 228-30. See also Goldfield, supra note
3, at 205-07. I do not wish to be seen as "blaming the victim." As Joel Rogers notes, un-

ions organize strategically and would "be quite reluctant to organize in sectors where they
did not already command significant power." Joel Rogers, In the Shadow of the Law: InstitutionalAspects of Postwar U.S. Union Decline, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA 283, 295
(1993). Moreover, the inadequate protections offered by the NLRA force unions to seriously consider the expected level of employer resistance.
90. See THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE
DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMiERICAN POLIcs 63 (1986).

91.
ORIGINS
92.
93.

See generally THE SPECTER: ORIGNAL ESSAYS ON THE COLD WAR AND THE
OF McCARTHYISm (Robert Griffith & Athan Theoharis eds., 1974).
See Edwards & Podgursky, supranote 86, at 32-33; see also Rogers, supranote 89.
Anil Verma & Mark Thompson, ManagerialStrategies in Canada and the U.S.
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Walter Korpi has noted that strikes in the United States in the
post-war period tended to be of relatively long duration, approximately 3 weeks. 4 That same duration was found in other western
nations up to World War II, but since then it has been cut by more
than 50%. Korpi notes that "employers in the United States have
also retained the strong, somewhat vehement, resistance to unions
common in most countries in earlier decades."9 5 We would expect,
says Korpi, that where the disparity of economic power between
management and labor is great, industrial conflict will be intense
and will affect the basic rights of collective bargaining, primarily on
the level of the workplace. However, when the gap in power resources is decreased, due to the increased organizational strength of
workers, employers gradually are forced to accept the basic rights of
employees. Over time, employer opposition to collective bargaining
tends to disappear. Korpi concludes that the explanation for American exceptionalism is that unions have remained weak and have not
been able to achieve the changes which have taken place in many
other countries."
It is hardly news that American unions are relatively weak, and
that their weaknesses are reflected in less sympathetic or even hostile
laws. Except for France, union density in the U.S. is lower than in all
other western democracies, a situation which existed prior to recent
domestic and international economic shocks. Moreover, as Joel Rogers
has noted, "no other system displays the postwar U.S. pattern of
uninterrupteddecline during the post-war years."9 7
Rather than placing the blame on the weaker party, it seems
more realistic to stress the continued and often vehement opposition
of American employers to unions and the fact that the state,
generally through its courts, has often aided that opposition. Thus,
while American unions may have contributed to some extent in their
own decline, union tactical decisions have always been made in the
context of inferior power positions.9
in the 1980s, IRRA PROC. (Barbara Dennis ed., 1988). See also Chaison & Rose, Union
Growth, supra note 8, at 23-24.
94. WALTER KORPI, THE DEMOCRATIC CLASS STRUGGLE 175 (1983).
95. Id. at 176.
96. Id.
97. Rogers, supra note 89, at 288.
98. Joel Rogers has argued that faced with the threat of employer opposition and the
weak protection of the NLRA, unions acted rationally, concentrating their efforts only in
sectors where they already had achieved substantial power. This argument deemphasizes
political choices made by unions in the 1940s and 1950s and stresses that a period of
genuine stability existed in the immediate post-war period. Rogers does not deny that union density has been falling since the mid-1950s, but he stresses that the unionized sector
remained stable until recently. Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: FurtherReflections on
the Distinctive CharacterofAmerican LaborLaw, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 113-17 (1990).
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As Chaison and Rose note, moreover, "the present low level of
organizing is caused by both the political and financial decisions
made within unions and such exogenous factors as employer resistance to unionization of the workforce and the public policy framework of union organizing."9 As union membership and dues fall, the
resources that can be devoted to organizing obviously decline as
well. Moreover, extensive organizing efforts may not seem wise to
union officials facing stiffer employer resistance and the uncertainties of a more hostile NLRB and judiciary. 10 0
POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND UNION MILITANCE
It is all too common to view American values and culture
through the lens of often hostile judicial decisions. Throughout
American history, employees and unions have expressed a set of
values radically different from those traditionally possessed by
courts. In addition, legislatures often reflected sentiments which
were sympathetic to collective action, reacting supportively to organizational campaigns and to union militance, whether in the area of
safety, injunctions or collective bargaining itself. The alleged historical exceptionalism of the United States is substantially based
upon judicial activism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
which invalidated a significant number of state and federal statutes. 1 1 But not all statutes were struck down and, most important,
in every case where courts invalidated a statute, legislatures had
acted upon a quite different set of values. 2 Therefore, one must be
99. Chaison & Rose, Union Growth, supra note 8, at 28.
100. Charles McDonald, Assistant to the AFL-CIO's Secretary-Treasurer, has candidly acknowledged that union organizers were challenged by the situation existing in the
1960s and 1970s. Since union membership seemed relatively stable and even grew in
some unions, little thought was given to altering tactics and strategies for organizing the
new workforce. Indeed, the "impetus to organize was in the hands of local leadership" and
some "viewed new organizing as a potential threat to their ability to be re-elected." McDonald, supra note 12, at 20. This situation has recently been seriously addressed by the
AFL-CIO, especially with the creation of its Organizing Institute charged with the responsibility to recruit and train union organizers.
McDonald has estimated that to maintain an organized level of 12.4 percent of the
private sector workforce, assuming a growth of 1.1 million workers per year, unions
would have to secure a yearly net gain of 136,000 workers. Unions, however, are gaining
approximately 90,000 new members yearly via NLRB elections, although new agreements
are secured in only 75 percent of the situations in which representation is secured. Given
a yearly loss of 10,000 members by decertification elections, McDonald concludes that "we
have to nearly double our current victories to achieve a gross addition of 136,000 new
members per year through NLRB processes" even excluding losses through plant closings
and other causes. Id. at 22. See also KORPI supra note 94 and accompanying text.
101. William Forbath, The Shaping of the American LaborMovement, 102 HARv.L.
REV. 1109, 1129-30 (1989).
102. See Melvin Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the
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careful of the tendency to assume that the labor views of certain
judges are the predominant statement of American values or culture. Employees and unions, and sometimes legislatures, often express a quite different set of values which recognize the need for
protection of employees and collective action to counteract the powerlessness of individual workers.
The recent legislation dealing with plant closings, family leave,
and the use of polygraphs, for instance, reveals continued legislative
willingness to intervene in the employment relationship. Indeed, the
experience of the last 25 years suggests the continued possibility of
federal and state legislation to protect important aspects of the employment relationship. The tolerance among legislators for labor
legislation is clearly limited, however, since the political cost is considered high.103 Indeed, although Congress has been willing to intervene in areas of occupational health and safety, plant closings, discrimination, and pensions, prospects for reform of the National Labor Relations Act may be slight even with a Democratic administration.
In general, special circumstances have been necessary to pass
any legislation dealing with unionization and collective bargaining.
It is difficult to believe that the Wagner Act would have been passed,
for instance, and perhaps even declared constitutional, without the
massive and collective action of committed and courageous workers
in the 1930s. 04 The Taft-Hartley Act, on the other hand, was passed
ProgressiveEra, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63 (1985); Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of
Contract"Reconsidered. Major Premises in the Law of Employment 1867-1937, SUP. CT.
HIsT. SocYY.B. 20 (1984).
103. James Pope has perceptively noted that unlike other groups whose interests
may conflict with portions of the business community, 'labor is locked in an adversarial
one-on-one relationship with business-the interest group acknowledged by even the
most enthusiastic pluralists as unquestionably the strongest." James Pope, Labor and the
Constitution:FromAbolition to Deindustrialization,65 TEx. L. REV. 1071, 1122-23 (1987).
104. There is a rich literature dealing with the reasons for the Wagner Act's
passage. In addition to pluralist, corporate liberal and other theories, some have stressed
the extent to which the state is autonomous in relation to social and economic forces.
Kenneth Finegold & Theda Skocpol, State, Party and Industry: From Business Recovery
to the Wagner Act in America's New Deal, in STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 159
(Charles Bright & Susan Harding eds., 1984); Theda Skocpol, Political Responses to
Capitalist Crisis:Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal, 10 POL.
& Socy 2, 168 (1980). The latter view, especially, necessarily plays down the role of
working class disruption, and the "state autonomists" have recently been challenged by
Michael Goldfield. See Michael Goldfield, Worker Insurgency, Radical Organization, and
New Deal LaborLegislation,83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1257 (1989). Goldfield stresses the rise
of labor militancy and the increased influence of radical organizations and the interaction
of these groups with liberal and governmental reformers. The strikes of 1934 in
Minneapolis, Toledo, and San Francisco were led by radicals and many believed or feared
that this was only the beginning of further revolutionary activity. Goldfield is critical of
approaches that slight the importance of the social context of political events.

19941

LAW AND UNION POWER

just after the wave of post-war strikes. The statute, however, also
reflected hostility to unions and the NLRA which had surfaced as
early as 1937 and 1938, and passage also was a result of wartime
strikes, primarily those of the United Mine Workers, which had
weakened labor's political support. Practically, of course, TaftHartley was a response to the Republican capture of both Houses of
the Congress. Finally, the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act of
1959 was primarily a response to the televised revelations of
Senator McClellan's hearings on union corruption. This history suggests that although there may be hope for legislative reform
affecting employment in certain areas, amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act favorable to unions will be politically difficult.
Beyond national differences in substantive law and procedure,
the Canadian experience has historically "proceeded more frequently through attempts at multipartite negotiations at the highest
level, or through ad hoc interventions which regulate or supersede
the outcomes of collective bargaining in designated classes of cases,
especially in the public sector, than through a systematic weakening
of the competitive position of organized labor within the adversarial
system."1"5 David Kettler, et al., argue that because Canada has been
relatively willing to intervene directly, it has been less inclined to
affect actual bargaining outcomes by manipulating bargaining
strengths or legal rules. Compulsory union recognition, however,
came only during wartime, rather than, as in the United States,
during a serious and prolonged depression. The popular support for
the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, forerunner of the New
Democratic Party, combined with an enormous strike wave led to
P.C. 1003, which imposed a structure similar to the Wagner Act,
including compulsory union recognition and collective bargaining,
on
10 6
a system which already had experienced extensive intervention.
Peter Bruce persuasively argues that Canada's legal environment is more sympathetic to unions because of systematic differences in political party systems. He stresses the presence of a social
democratic party operating in a parliamentary system which mag-

105. Kettler, supranote 10, at 173.
106. Jeremy Webber, The Malaise of Compulsory Conciliation: Strike Prevention
during World War II, in THE CHARACTER OF CLASS STRUGGLE: ESSAYS IN MODERN
WORKING CLASs HIsTORY 1850-1985, at 138 (Bryan D. Palmer ed., 1986); Judy Fudge,

Voluntarism and Compulsion: The Canadian Federal Government's Intervention in
Collective Bargaining from 1900 to 1946, (1988) (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford). See
also Taylor Hollander, 'Intentional" versus "Conjunctional" History: The Canadian State
and Collective Bargaining, 1938-1944, (October 15, 1993) (unpublished paper presented to
the Annual North American Labor History Conference, Detroit, Michigan, on file with
author).
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nifies the effect of a third party. 0 7 The Liberal Party, for instance,
often supports labor legislation in order to ward off, or co-opt, the
votes that might otherwise go to the NDP. Indeed, Liberals have
tended to support labor legislation when they were most at risk
rather than most secure. °8 In sum, Canadian labor law reforms
have tended to be implemented in situations when the major parties
have felt least secure.
Interestingly, in focusing on the 1965 attempt to repeal the
NLRA's "right to work" provision, section 14(b), and the attempt to
pass the relatively pallid Labor Reform Bill of 1978, Bruce found
that the representatives from America's most unionized and populated states tended to vote overwhelmingly in favor of organized labor's positions, while those from less unionized and less densely
populated states generally opposed such reforms. While this, in itself, is hardly surprising, he stresses the unrepresentative nature of
the U.S. Senate. The pro-union senators in 1965, and those who
failed to overcome the filibuster against the labor reform statute in
1978, "represented nearly twice as many voters as their triumphant
opponents."'0 9 In short, these two pro-union efforts would have been
successful if based solely upon the voters represented. Again, in
conjunction with my argument that some institutions, for instance,
legislatures, have often been more sympathetic to unions than the
courts, the conclusion is that institutional and political differences
between the two countries are extremely important. Comparative
analysis is made exceedingly difficult by such political and social differences, and they caution against the assumption that the laws of
one nation can easily be exported to another. °
107. As many writers have noted, an important feature of "American exceptionalism" is the absence of a social democratic political party. See FERGUSON & ROGERS, supra
note 88. "Lacking political vehicles of their own, American workers have long been disappearing as even a presence in the electoral system." Rogers, supra note 87, at 59. As
Rogers argues, union membership alone means little without effective organization and
coordination. As early as 1953, V.O. Key noted that U.S. labor lacks "proportionate durable power as a class." V. 0. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 52 (4th ed.,
1958). For a discussion of the importance of political ties to the NDP, see Kettler, supra
note 10, at 174-76.
108. Bruce argues that Canada's major parties introduce labor law reforms "at lower
thresholds of pressure than would be required in the U.S.," but they do so only when under intense electoral pressure, and not when governing with comfortable majorities.
Bruce, supra note 76, at 127.
109. Id. at 126.
110. Lawrence Rothstein has contrasted the quite different responses of
steelworkers facing plant shutdowns in Youngstown, Ohio, and Longwy, France.
LAWRENCE E. ROTHSTEIN, PLANT CLOSINGS: POWER, POLITICS, AND WORKERS 115-65

(1986). The French workers' struggle involved militant, collective action whereas Youngstown steelworkers, at least initially, ceded responsibility to an organization of area
clergy and, except for two occupations of US Steel Offices, primarily opted for a litigation-
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In Canada, as in the United States, organized labor appeared
to approach its high water mark in the 1950s. Huxley notes that,
after 1956, "escalating unemployment and anti-union provincial
legislation frustrated union hopes for expansion. Unemployment in
Canada between 1957 and 1962, which was more prolonged and
severe than in the United States, increased the pressure for restrictive legislation and facilitated its passage.""' But economic
recovery, combined with the political leverage for labor gained by
the New Democratic Party, permitted labor to "reverse dramatically
this pattern of union decline during the remainder of the decade.""
From 1961 on, "Canada experienced a cycle of union growth and
militancy.., beyond any level of unrest in the U.S."' Large and
long strikes during the 1960s and early 1970s ended the use of the
ex parte injunction as provincial governments tended to adopt conciliatory approaches." 4
As Roy Adams argues, "[t]he reason for the more liberal nature
of Canadian labour policy seems... to lie in the different nature of
the two political systems and in particular, in the adoption by the
Canadian labour movement of a viable partisan political strategy,"
one more like that of European movements which have a social philosophy as well as a political arm." 5
Union militance, however, is not necessarily incompatible with
cooperation. A number of Canadian provinces have mandated the
creation of joint employee-employer committees, elected by unorganbased strategy. The "forms and militancy of labor struggles depend on institutional supports and belief systems," id. at 140, and Rothstein notes that the Longwy workers received substantial, and early, support from national union organizations as well as certain elected officials, political parties, and the public. See also Lawrence Rothstein,
Industrial Restructuring and Worker Militancy- Liberal Pluralism vs. Class Conflict in
Youngstown and Longwy (1988) (unpublished paper on file with the author).
111. Huxley, supranote 3, at 125.
112. Id.
113. Id. The "incidence of strikes and man days lost due to strikes steadily increased
reaching new records." Seymour Fabor, CanadianWorkers Action From the Middle of the
1960s to the Beginning of the 1980s, in WITHIN THE SHELL OF THE OLD: ESSAYS ON
WORKERS' SELF-ORGANIZATION 61-69 (Jon Fitz & David Roediger eds., 1990). There was a
high percentage of wildcat strikes-dealing with job security and working conditions-accounting for 33% of all strikes in 1966 and 21% of total strikes in 1965. As in the United
States, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with existing union affiliation and leadership. See BRYAN PALMER, WORKING CLASS EXPERIENCE: THE RISE AND RECONSTITUTION
OF CANADIAN LABOUR, 1800-1980, at 280-81 (1983).
114. The separation of the Canadian UAW from the American based autoworkers'
union was at least partly a reaction to the UAW's willingness to grant concessions. Concession bargaining has been much less pronounced in Canada than in the U.S. even in the
same industries. See, e.g., Chaison & Rose, New Directions,supra note 1, at 593-95.
115. Roy Adams, North American IndustrialRelations: Divergent Trends in Canada
and the United States, 128 INT'L LAB. REV. 47, 60 (1989).
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ized employees or designated by a union representative, to deal with
issues such as occupational health and safety. The spread of these
committees, similar in some ways to European works councils, and
the transformation of arbitration from a private to a public process,
reflect a move to a more European model of industrial relations.,,
Differences in political structure and union militancy, therefore, are
crucial in any understanding of the contrast between the substantive law of Canada and that of the United States.
There is little reason to believe that Canadian employers, many
of whom are based in the U.S., have less of a desire to "escape from
the fetters imposed by collective bargaining.""' The absence of a
corporate offensive in Canada can be explained by the militancy of
Canadian unions and a state that "has been much more insistent
that employers respect the letter and the spirit of the law."" 8 Huxley
concludes that:
the most striking differences between the Canadian and American movements during the past two decades is the increasing importance of more
adversarial and political unionism in Canada, marked above all by the in-

terdependence and effective mutual aid between key unions and the New
Democratic Party in English Canada, and analogous developments in

Quebec.19
During this time in the U.S., union concerns were only intermittently of interest to the Democratic Party and at present are
commonly referred to as "special interests," akin to sugar producers
and toothpaste manufacturers.
LAW AND THE PERCEPTION OF UNION POWER

Both Congress and the courts in the U.S. seem to respond
affirmatively to unions only when they are seen as troublesome.
Concededly, legislative reform in American history has often been
restrictive of unions rather than supportive, the most noteworthy
exception being the Wagner Act of 1935. Even this statute, however,
was not passed solely to protect the interests of employees, for one of
the primary concerns was the felt need to decrease the incidence of
strikes by promoting collective bargaining and by resolving
representation disputes by peaceful administrative means. Recent
studies have argued that increases in unionization may lead to more
strikes, but, importantly, unionization is also a consequence of
116. See Roy Adams, IndustrialRelations and the Economic Crisis, in INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN A DECADE OF EcONOMIC CHANGE 115 (Hervey Jervis et al. eds., 1985).
117. Roy Adams, The Role ofthe State in IndustrialRelations, in RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND HUAIAN RESOUCES 508 (D. Lewin et al. eds., 1992).
118. Id.
119. Huxley, supra note 3, at 131.
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strikes. 2 ' That is, unions tend to grow and expand when they are
seen as active protectors and militant representatives of employees.
Critically, it may be only at such times that the law responds to
expressions of collective vigor. 2 ' Thus, it is relevant that union
density declines in tandem with reduced organizational efforts.
Even judges seem to react to union militance, for many judicial
decisions seem to be based upon perceptions of union power. In the
1944 NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc.122 decision, for instance, the
Supreme Court upheld a broad definition of "employee" in order to
include within the Act all those who needed protection, whether or
not they would be treated as "employees" or "independent contractors" under traditional common law rules. The Supreme Court
stressed that the NLRA should be read broadly so that it could:
bring industrial peace by substituting... the rights of workers to selforganization and collective bargaining for the industrial strife which
23
prevails where these rights are not effectively established.

The stress on industrial peace and interruption of commerce
clearly reflects the Court's understanding that the NLRA, passed in
the midst of the turbulent depression, could not fulfill its goals without a liberal, inclusive interpretation. Such a message was especially clear during wartime when there was a felt need to institutionalize labor relations within an administrative system.

120. Michael Wallace et al., American Labor Law: Its Impact on Working Class
Militancy, 1901-1980, 12 Soc. Sc. HIST. 1, 29 (1988).

Union successes may lead to further increases in membership "because employers
find it more difficult to retaliate against individual union members and partly because
unions find it easier to apply social coercion and union security provisions." GEORGE BAIN
& FAROUK ELSHEKHH, UNION GROWTH AND THE BUSNESS CYCLE 85 (1976). On the other

hand, higher levels of union organization may make additional organizing more difficult
because the "relatively easily organizable units are organized first, leading to a diminished return to given levels of organizing efforts. Jack Fiorito et al., Determinants of
Unionism: A Review of the Literature, in RESEARCH IN PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 291 (Kendrith Rowland & Gerald Ferris eds., 1986).

121. It is common to explain the upsurge in public sector organization in the 1960s
and 1970s "by the passage of laws (executive orders) that have sought to bring the private
sector industrial relations model to the public sector." Richard Freeman, Unionism Comes
to the Public Sector, 24 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 41, 42 (1986). Michael Goldfield has
challenged this thesis noting, for instance, that the 1962 Federal Executive Order 10988
was in large part a response to, rather than a cause of, the dramatic increase in union organization. Moreover, initial growth in teachers' unions seems to have preceded state collective bargaining statutes. Referring to both the growth in federal and state employee organization, Goldfield concludes that "it was the initial takeoff in public sector union
growth that stimulated the passage of collective bargaining laws." Michael Goldfield, Public
Sector Union Growth and PublicPolicy, 18 POL'Y STUD. J. 404,415 (Winter 1989-90).

122. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
123. Id. at 125.
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Recently, however, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 124 and NLRB
v. Yeshiva University,125 the Supreme Court has, without any supporting legislative history, excluded from the statute perhaps hundreds of thousands of employees deemed to be "managerial employees," employees who are in a position to formulate and effectuate
managerial policies. This judicial policymaking has profound effects,
especially given the changing nature of the workplace and increased
concern about decentralizing "managerial" decisionmaking. 116 Not a
word will be found in these recent opinions about industrial strife or
the need to institutionalize labor conflict within the beneficial
embrace of the statute. Perhaps the Court no longer sees a need to
read the NLRA broadly because it no longer fears the "industrial
strife which prevails where these rights are not effectively established."2 7
The same pattern can be seen in other areas. The Court in the
1960s, for instance, included subcontracting within the mandatory
scope of bargaining because
one of the primary purposes of the act is to promote a peaceful settlement
of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to
the mediatory influence of negotiation. The act was framed with an
negotiate had been one of the most
awareness that refusals to confer12and
8
prolific causes of industrial strife.

It is true that the Court continually refers to industrial peace
as if it were the only policy of the Act, ignoring other policies such as
124. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
125. 444 U.S. 672 (1980). A brilliant critique of Yeshiva can be found in Karl Kare,
The Bitter and the Sweet: Reflections on the Supreme Court's Yeshiva Decision, 71 SoCIALIST REV. 99 (1991); see also ATLESON, ASSUMIPTIONS, supranote 39, at 175-77.
126. MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DMDE:

POssIBILIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984).
127. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 125.
128. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964). The
Supreme Court distinguished between "mandatory" and "permissive" matters of bargaining. The former must be discussed and, most importantly, cannot be altered before good
faith negotiations take place. Employers, however, can unilaterally alter permissive
terms without bargaining and can refuse to bargain about them. Unions, in addition, may
not strike over a permissive issue. By placing most critical capital-based decisions in the
permissive category, the Court has negated any assumption that labor and employers are
equal partners in the enterprise.
For an insightful article contrasting Canadian and American approaches see Brian
Langille, "Equal Partnership"in Canadian Labour Law, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 496
(1983). Langille notes that Canada has rejected a permissive/mandatory dichotomy
although employers can refuse to bargain over any particular item no matter how critical.
Id. at 504. Nevertheless, unlike United States law, the union can insist upon any item to
the point of impasse and strike over the matter. The result is to permit the economic
battle to encompass any issue, a laissez-faire position not followed in the United States.
See, e.g., ATLESON, ASSUMPTIONS, supra note 39, at 111-35.
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industrial democracy and equality of bargaining. Nevertheless, industrial peace was often employed up to the 1970s to justify a fairly
liberal interpretation of the NLRA. As late as 1979, the Court upheld a NLRB ruling holding that the prices of Ford Motor Company's in-plant food service was a subject of mandatory bargaining.
The employees had boycotted the food service, and the Court referred to that action as an example of the kind of labor strife that
might occur if the scope of bargaining were not read in an expansive
fashion. 2 9 Yet only two years later in First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB 130 the Court held that a partial closing of the enterprise, obviously much more important to employees than cafeteria
food prices, was not within the scope of mandatory bargaining.
The Bell, Yeshiva, and First National Maintenance cases are
consistent with the view that courts no longer feel a need to read the
Act broadly so as to institutionalize labor conflict and reduce
strikes.'' Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the likely responses
of the courts, the NLRB, and Congress are related to the perception
of weakened union power. Courts as well as Congress, therefore, are
affected by what is happening in bargaining rooms, the workplace,
and in the streets. Current decisions of the courts not only embody
certain values which resonate throughout American legal history,
but the state of the law also reflects the perceived relative strength
of unions just as much as the hostility or indifference of any current
administration.
In a study of the remarkable outpouring of labor legislation in
Western Europe between 1968 and 1977, Alan Hyde concluded that
legislation is likely when "a perceived upsurge in worker discontent
or unrest leads to a perception on the part of the governing elite that
some concession is desirable in order to restore worker loyalty to the
regime, restore order, or simply 'cool down' the situation. " 132 The significant legislation of this period followed widespread labor unrest;
yet, as Hyde notes, "none of the legal changes overtly addressed the
problem of strike control," although most could be thought of as
concessions to organized workers.3
129. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
130. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
131. A similar observation has recently been made by David Feller concerning judicial action in a quite different area. Traditionally, courts have viewed arbitration to be a
substitute for the strike, and for this reason, Feller believes, courts have been reluctant to
overturn awards. In recent years, however, Feller finds a greater judicial willingness to
set aside arbitration awards, a result he attributes to the perception that a strike is not
likely to be chosen as a vehicle to resolve a dispute. Donald Weckstein, Feller Visits "The
Classics"with a Vintage Review of Three Articles, THE CHRONICLE, Jan. 1994, at 9.
132. Alan Hyde, A Theory ofLaborLegislation, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 436 (1990).
133. Id. at 423.
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Unlike other Western European industrialized countries, the
United States has rarely responded to labor unrest by enacting supportive or ameliorative legislation. With the exception of the 1935
Wagner Act, there has been no statutory activity supporting unions
or collective bargaining. The Taft Hartley Act of 1947 can be seen, as
Hyde notes, as "the last effective labor legislation in an advanced
industrial economy which is wholly repressive of union power and
contains no element of concessions to workers."134
CONCLUSION

Obviously, union power is adversely affected by NLRB and Supreme Court decisions, and the political structure of Canada is unlikely to be transported to the United States, despite "free trade" arrangements. The point I wish to stress is that the law, whether we
look at legislative reform possibilities or court decisions, also reflects
the current (and perhaps accurate) perception of union strength and
militance. This perception has been affected by the failure of both
the Labor Reform and Situs Picketing Bills in the 1970s, Reagan's
behavior, especially in regard to the air controllers, and the strong
employer attack of the last decade. Yet, as was the case with the
passage of the Wagner Act, it is only when unions are perceived to
be a force to be reckoned with that the legal system responds in favorable ways. 135 Although the legal system sometimes acts repressively, there will be little possibility of a positive response unless unions are perceived to be vital and troublesome economic actors. 3 It
is, thus, quite possible to view the current U.S. legal situation as the
result of the perception of union weakness and not simply a cause of
that weakness. Importantly, unions have focused so much of their
efforts on formal law and governmental regulation that they may
tend to forget that the system favors the strong and the troublesome.

134. Id. at 443-44.
135. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
136. Prognostication has not generally been a strong point of academic legal

analysis, however some recognition of possible legal change is necessary. Some reform of
the NLRA is possible under the Clinton administration, especially as a trade-off for the
modification or repeal of section 8(a)(2), which limits the employer creation of certain
types of"participation" structures.

